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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Nearly half of all industrial union contracts mandate joint labor-management health and safety 
committees (JHSCs). In the past five years, mandated JHSCs have also become common in the public 
sector in states that have enacted occupational safety statutes for public workers. And now many health 
and safety activists are advocating state and federal laws that would require all workplaces, union and 
nonunion, to have JHSCs. Although such laws are vitally important in establishing worker rights to safe 
workplaces, by themselves joint committees cannot be expected to solve serious health and safety 
problems. 
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Nearly half of all industrial union contracts mandate joint labor-
management health and safety committees (JHSCs). In the past 
five years, mandated JHSCs have also become common in the 
public sector in states that have enacted occupational safety 
statutes for public workers. And now many health and safety 
activists are advocating state and federal laws that would require 
all workplaces, union and nonunion, to have JHSCs. Although such 
laws are vitally important in establishing worker rights to safe 
workplaces, by themselves joint committees cannot be expected 
to solve serious health and safety problems. 
There is no question that the JHSC process has been effective 
in educating management and the workforce about occupational 
health and safety hazards. Many joint committees have developed 
procedures and policies aimed at preventing occupational hazards, 
and where committees have the ability to inspect the workplace, 
they have had success in jointly identifying hazards. Some joint 
committees, for example, have addressed hazards posed by video 
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display terminals (VDTs), developing guidelines for the proper 
purchase, installation and use of VDT equipment, furniture, and 
lighting. 
But despite their popularity, JHSCs have had minimal success 
in actually lowering illness and injury rates because few have the 
authority to implement health and safety solutions. Their role is 
purely advisory. Employers remain ultimately responsible for 
providing a safe, healthy workplace, and they aren't bound to 
implement recommendations from their JHSCs. Even when top 
management expresses its commitment to joint problem-solving, 
that commitment often wavers when management is faced with 
the cost of implementing committee recommendations. 
Relying on Joint Committees 
The example of the Public Employee Federation (PEF) of New 
York State illustrates the dangers unions face when they rely on 
joint committees as their primary instruments for solving health 
and safety problems. PEF represents more than 57,000 employees 
in the State of New York who work in a variety of professional 
and technical jobs, and are exposed to asbestos, toxics, and infec-
tious diseases, as well as frequent assaults by inmates and clients. 
In 1985, PEF negotiated a well thought-out Joint Health and 
Safety Committee structure, which operates at three levels—at the 
workplace, the agency and state-wide. Its purpose, defined 
contractually, is to study and review health and safety issues and 
to advise the State on how to improve conditions. Local commit-
tees are the backbone of the joint committee structure; they were 
formed to solve worksite problems without having to go up the 
bureaucratic chain of command. More than 200 local committees 
meet quarterly, conduct inspections and investigate accidents. 
While the committees often include representatives of three other 
bargaining agents representing workers at a facility, PEF members 
lead the committees' direction. 
In 1986 PEF and New York State sponsored an extensive JHSC 
training called "Working Well." The union dedicated a good deal 
of money and staff time to this training program. More than 500 
managers and 500 PEF committee members participated in the 
two-day program taught by PEF, along with staff from several New 
York universities. All aspects of a JHSCs role and function were 
reviewed, from running effective meetings to identifying worksite 
hazards. Program participants each received the "Working Well" 
manual, a well-prepared health-and-safety resource book to guide 
their committee activities. And, PEF provided follow-up training 
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for union committee members to reinforce the joint committee 
process. 
While union members and management consider the training 
program successful, some PEF representatives are disappointed 
with the lack of progress since the training. 
Angela DeVito, an industrial hygienist hired by PEF from 
1984-1989 to assist the committees, believes that the joint com-
mittee process is no substitute for independent union action and 
government regulation and enforcement. Although the joint 
structure was set up to encourage resolution of problems at the 
worksite, most serious problems, particularly those that cost a 
significant amount of money, aren't resolved by local managers 
but are referred to the State's Office of Employee Relations (OER). 
"OER doesn't like to spend money," reports DeVito, and PEF 
committee members have little input into its decisions. As a result, 
PEF files about seven OSH complaints a month with the State on 
problems the joint process fails to correct. While PEF members 
expect the joint process to solve their health and safety problems, 
committee members are frustrated with the State's negative 
responses in committee meetings. According to DeVito, PEF has 
"focused energy on the joint process while neglecting the strength 
of union-based committee activities. Members feel it is permissible 
to participate in joint activities but fear reprisals when asked to 
join union actions." 
After five years of JHSC activity, the illness and injury rate for 
PEF's workforce has gone up, not down—to 15.3%. The State has 
consistently turned down union proposals on how to spend the 
annual negotiated health-and-safety budget. As a result, less than 
one-third of the $900,000 negotiated in the last agreement was 
actually spent. Several major funding proposals (a statewide 
asbestos awareness program and a safety resource center that 
would serve as a computerized database of agency illnesses and 
injuries, for example) are currently before the State. If denied, 
PEF's only recourse is to plan strategies that utilize the strength 
of its membership to convince State officials. 
The PEF example demonstrates that unions participating in 
JHSCs must exercise traditional organizing strategies, outside the 
joint process, to pressure employers to implement committee 
recommendations. Unions which rely on the joint process to 
resolve their members' health and safety problems will become 
frustrated with the process and gradually lose their ability to 
activate their rank and file around health and safety issues. 
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Making JHSCs Work 
When unions employ traditional organizing strategies, both 
outside and inside the joint process, they are more likely to be 
able to resolve major health and safety problems. For example, 
in the Philadelphia area, Local 234 of the Transport Workers Union 
(TWU) relies on the unity and action of its members to push the 
joint process along. 
TWU 234 represents about 5,600 bus, train and trolley car 
drivers, mechanics and maintenance workers employed by the 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA). 
Working in bus depots, rail and subway stations, garages and 
dispatching facilities, TWU members are exposed to unsafe track 
conditions, toxic automotive substances, asbestos, electrical 
hazards and poorly operating vehicles. 
After a survey of union members revealed numerous health and 
safety problems, TWU made OSH a top priority. First it got SEPTA 
management to agree to third-party intervention to assist the union 
and management in their relations. The Philadelphia Area Labor-
Management Committee (PALM), a group formed by the AFL-CIO 
and the Chamber of Commerce to facilitate labor-management 
relations, was hired by the Authority. Through PALM and through 
publicity on rider safety, TWU was able to exert outside pressure 
on SEPTA management over a period of years. Finally, prepared 
to strike over health and safety, the local negotiated a two-tiered 
JHSC structure in its 1989 agreement. Joint Location Committees 
periodically inspect their worksites and meet monthly to resolve 
problems. The joint inspection process has proven to be an effec-
tive method for identifying and resolving hazards. Another joint 
committee—made up of union staff, members and SEPTA mana-
gers—provides oversight to Location Committees and coordinates 
employee education and training. 
TWU 234 steps outside the joint process when it has to. When 
management will not act on a Committee recommendation, the 
union grieves the matter, proceeds to arbitration on an expedited 
basis, and plans worker actions to inform the public and to show 
the company its determination. 
Last March five passengers were killed on a SEPTA train in 
Philadelphia when a 600-pound motor fell from the bottom of a 
subway train, causing a derailment. TWU was excluded from the 
National Transportation Safety Board's investigation, because the 
Board felt the union's members lacked the technical skills to 
conduct an investigation. So TWU conducted its own inquiry, 
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relying on its members' knowledge of train maintenance and 
operation. After interviewing mechanics and reviewing the 
railcar's inspection history, the union found that there was a 
documented history of problems with its motor support bolts. Five 
days before the accident, a management foreman had inspected 
the car that derailed and failed to discover the weakened suspen-
sion system. 
Throughout the union's investigation, SEPTA withheld impor-
tant information. In May TWU presented its findings during public 
hearings in Philadelphia. Local leaders expect that the investi-
gation's report will confirm what TWU has been telling SEPTA 
and the riding public all along—that SEPTA s maintenance program 
is inadequate and that mechanics aren't properly trained. 
Local 234's Health and Safety Committee Chair, Bruce Bodner, 
believes that the accident demonstrates the need for stricter 
government regulation and oversight. Since there is no public 
employee OSHA statute in Pennsylvania, the union doesn't have 
the ability to file OSHA complaints. "There must be external 
pressures on SEPTA in addition to their internal self-regulation 
process", says Bodner. TWU's approach to the joint committee 
process is practical. "We approach the joint committee process 
as a negotiation session. The union must prepare demands, plan 
strategy, and appoint a spokesperson", says Bodner. 
Union members shouldn't be co-opted by the joint process. 
When union leadership doesn't prepare committee members 
adequately, members are surprised and frustrated when manage-
ment doesn't resolve identified problems. Too often, joint com-
mittees work on insignificant issues while glaring problems persist 
daily in the workplace. If the union ensures that its members are 
plugged in to the joint process, the committee's work will center 
around issues important to the workforce and the members will 
be involved at every step in the resolution. Like all well-run 
organizing campaigns, larger more complex issues, such as 
asbestos and carbon monoxide exposure, may take longer to 
resolve and may have to be resolved by the union independently. 
Local 285 of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), 
representing state workers in Massachusetts, is an example of a 
union that mobilized its rank-and-file independently to win 
improvements that the JHSC process failed to achieve. During a 
tight fiscal year, management and union members of the Joint 
Health and Safety Committee identified asbestos and toluene 
exposure as a significant probem for mechanics who worked on 
brake linings and clutches. The JHSC organized education and 
training programs, and developed asbestos procedures for mech-
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anics, but when mechanics asked for improvements that would 
cost significant amounts of money, the management represen-
tatives to the Committee claimed there weren't funds available. 
With the process stalled, the mechanics refused to work on brakes. 
After four months, management installed asbestos enclosure 
equipment in every garage, at a cost of more than $15,000, and 
spent thousands more on hundreds of respirators. The union 
action also prompted management to provide comprehensive 
medical exams for all mechanics. 
Making OSH Laws Work 
When public sector union committees are operating in states 
without public sector OSH statutes, as was the case with the TWU 
and SEIU committees described above, they must work very hard 
to activate their members around health and safety issues. But 
even when OSH regulations exist, enforcement is often difficult 
to achieve. 
In New Jersey, for example, the Communications Workers of 
America (CWA) led the fight for the public employee occupational 
safety and health act (PEOSHA) in 1984. This statute covers some 
350,000 public employees in more than 9,000 work locations 
throughout the state. The N.J. Department of Labor, responsible 
for enforcing the statute, reports that the occupational illness and 
injury rate for every 100 public workers is more than 14%, 
compared to a national average of 8.6% for every 100 private sector 
workers. Despite the high rate of occupational illness and injury 
in New Jersey the State employs fewer than 50 inspectors to 
enforce the PEOSH act. CWA testifies at budget hearings each year 
for increasing the number of inspectors and frequently mobilizes 
its members around health and safety issues. Yet despite these 
efforts, enforcement remains inadequate. 
Canada's experience with legislated joint committees reinforces 
the point that joint committees are no substitute for vigorous 
government enforcement. The law requiring public and private 
sector JHSCs became effective in 1979. Six years later, the 
Canadian government conducted a survey of 3,000 JHSCs in 
Ontario, the country's most industrialized province. Survey results 
revealed an extremely low level of compliance with the general 
provisions of the law. Worse yet, ten years after the JHSC legisla-
tion, workplace illness, injury and fatality rates had not declined, 
and in some cases, had risen. Permanent disability claims had 
increased more than 100% and serious lost-time claims had 
increased more than 30%. 
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The Ontario Public Service Employees Union, which represents 
inspectors, blames the JHSC failure on the government's use of 
joint committees as a substitute for government enforcement. 
According to Bob DeMatteo, the union's Director of Safety and 
Health Education, within several years after the law went into 
effect, the number of inspectors was drastically reduced and those 
remaining "were relegated to a role of facilitators in the internal 
responsibility system and the system of voluntary compliance." 
After the Act's passage, inspectors rarely issued orders to comply, 
but instead referred outstanding issues to the joint committee. 
Since committees had no legal authority to implement decisions, 
employers were off the hook and had no internal or external 
pressure to resolve health and safety problems. 
Conclusion 
Canadian and U.S. experience with JHSCs so far shows that they 
can be a valuable tool to identify problems and educate the 
workforce about on-the-job hazards. But if unions want to correct 
the most significant problems causing accidents and illnesses, they 
must involve their members (and the public) in campaigns to 
expose and pressure employers who fail to resolve hazards and 
regulatory agencies who fail to enforce adequate standards. 
The pitfall of JHSCs for unions is the subtle, erroneous message 
they send to members and the public that the JHSC process alone 
will solve health and safety problems. When problems persist, 
workers lose confidence in the committee as well as in their union. 
To prevent this from happening, unions must teach their 
members to see the joint committee as a forum for negotiation 
and education, while the union remains the workers' instrument 
for solving problems. Independent union committees continue to 
have two tasks—to pressure the employer to implement solutions, 
and to pressure government agencies to impose stiff penalties for 
noncompliance with the law. • 
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